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FALLING AWAY INTO DISEASE:
DISABILITY-DEVIANCE NARRATIVES IN
AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL
MATT SALEH†
INTRODUCTION
Who in society is predisposed to crime? Many of us are familiar
with cultural narratives that trace criminal behavior to some
cognitive defect in the perpetrator.1 For instance, we might recall
the persistent media allusions to Adam Lanza’s Asperger
Syndrome after the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary
School,2 despite evidence that individuals on the autism spectrum
are, on average, not more likely, and are quite possibly less likely,
to commit serious crime in their lifetime.3 Similarly, popular
narratives about the relationship between “mental illness” and
violence are pervasive, despite the broad meaning of the
terminology and a deeply-misunderstood relationship between
psychiatric disability and crime.4
†
Matt Saleh, J.D., Ph.D., is a lecturer in Cornell University’s Disability Studies
sequence, and adjunct professor of political science at the State University of New
York at Cortland.
1
See, e.g., Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., Evolving Public Views on the Likelihood
of Violence from People with Mental Illness: Stigma and Its Consequences, 38 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1735, 1735 (2019).
2
Compare Liza Long, ‘I am Adam Lanza’s Mother’: A Mom’s Perspective on the Mental
Illness Conversation in America, HUFFPOST (Dec. 16, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/i-am-adam-lanzas-mother-mental-illness-conversation_n_2311009
[https://perma.cc/2QX5-TQNQ], with Alice Park, Don’t Blame Adam Lanza’s Violence on
Asperger’s, TIME MAG. (Mar. 11, 2014), https://time.com/19957/adam-lanzas-violencewasnt-typical-of-aspergers/ [https://perma.cc/5NC5-WZKC].
3
See, e.g., Claire King & Glynis H. Murphy, A Systematic Review of People with
Autism Spectrum Disorder and the Criminal Justice System, 44 J. AUTISM & DEV.
DISORD. 2717, 2717–18, 2730 (2014); Katie Maras et al., Is Autism Linked to
Criminality? 19 AUTISM 515, 515–16 (2015); Anthony Holland, Criminal Behaviour
and Developmental Disability: An Epidemiological Perspective, in OFFENDERS WITH
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 23, 25, 31 (William Lindsay et al. eds., 2004);
Catherine A. Cheely et al., The Prevalence of Youth with Autism Spectrum Disorders
in the Criminal Justice System, 42 J. AUTISM & DEV. DISORD. 1856, 1860 (2012).
4
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass
Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240, 240–
41 (2015); Yasmeen Abutaleb & William Wan, After Trump Blames Mental Illness for
Mass Shootings, Health Agencies Ordered to Hold All Posts on Issue, WASH. POST
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/after-trump-blames-mentalillness-for-mass-shootings-health-agencies-ordered-to-hold-all-posts-on-issue/2019/08
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From Batman5 to Bundy,6 narratives in popular culture that
explain crime through allusions to developmental,7 intellectual,8
psychiatric,9 or psychosocial impairments10 are ubiquitous.11 In
one popular idiom, the disabled offender is “imbecilic” or “mad” to
the point of lacking moral volition or free will.12 In another, the
disabled offender is “psychopathic,” antisocial and personalitydisordered, but also competent, volitional, and accountable—
sometimes terrifyingly so—to the point of evil genius or
predation.13 Tellingly, within these stories and the idioms they
/20/c4030e4c-c370-11e9-b5e4-54aa56d5b7ce_story.html
[https://perma.cc/D97PS5V8] (quoting former president Donald Trump: “[m]ental illness and hatred pulls the
INST.
MENTAL
HEALTH
(2019),
trigger.”);
Mental
Illness,
NAT’L
https://bit.ly/2ZFH2XW [https://perma.cc/42LP-7V8H] (noting that almost half of
adolescents, 49.5%, will experience a mental illness during their lifetime); see also Tori
DeAngelis, Mental Illness and Violence: Debunking Myths, Addressing Realities, 52
MONITOR PSYCH. 1, 1–2 (2021) (“While perpetrating violence is relatively uncommon
among those with serious mental illness, when it does occur, in many cases it is
intertwined with other . . . environmental factors.”); Jillian K. Peterson et al., How
Often and How Consistently do Symptoms Directly Precede Criminal Behavior Among
Offenders With Mental Illness?, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (2014); Rajeev Ramchand
& Lynsay Ayer, Is Mental Illness a Risk Factor for Gun Violence?, RAND CORP. (Apr.
15, 2021), https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/essays/mental-illnessrisk-factor-for-gun-violence.html [https://perma.cc/56HM-T5MX].
5
THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. Picture, et al. 2008) (Page 16 of the
screenplay: “He’s a paranoid schizophrenic, a former patient at Arkham [Asylum]. The
kind of mind the Joker attracts.”).
6
Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1408 (11th Cir. 1988) (considering competence
to stand trial in the case of Ted Bundy’s “bipolar mood disorder”).
7
See, e.g., US (Monkeypaw Productions & Perfect World Pictures 2019) (horror
film in which actress Lupita Nyong’o’s demonic doppelganger has the symptoms of
spasmodic dysphonia).
8
See, e.g., JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (1937).
9
See, e.g., THE INCREDIBLES (Pixar Animation Studios 2004) (primary villain
named “Syndrome” is criminally insane and delusional).
10
See, e.g., WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT KEVIN (BBC Films 2012) (containing strong
implication that the title character’s sociopathy, and shocking school violence, stems
from a psychosocial mixture of extreme colic in infancy, and his mother’s coldness from
post-partum depression).
11
See Russell D. Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity,
61 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2009) (“Not only is criminal madness an intrinsically
powerful melodramatic plot device, it touches upon fundamental social and
psychological issues central to cultural conceptions of justice, proper social
organization, and the self.”).
12
Id. at 1396–97 (“Of Mice and Men . . . explored what might be called, to use the
language of Buck v. Bell, ‘imbecilic’ criminality . . . the linkage between crime and
mental retardation is assumed . . . [asking readers] to make a moral assessment of the
role of volition in criminal responsibility.”).
13
The volitional-but-pathological “evil genius” is particularly invoked in accounts
of white-collar crime and racially-white serial murder. See generally Nick Bilton, “She
Absolutely Has Sociopathic Tendencies”: Elizabeth Holmes, Somehow, Is Trying to
FAIR
(June
8,
2018),
Start
a
New
Company!,
VANITY
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render, childlike incompetence and psychopathic aptitude can be
difficult to parse, leading to the befuddlement of law enforcement
or the courts.14
Stories are inherently intrigued with cause-and-effect, and so
is law.15 Existing scholarship has highlighted the important role
that criminal law,16 and the carceral state more broadly, have
played in constructing the modern understanding of cognitive
disability in the West.17 In particular, tenuously-biomedical18
constructs of insanity as “disease of the mind,”19 incompetence,20
and dangerous mental abnormality in civil confinement under
state police power21 have themselves become cultural memes,
helping to form societal understandings—and myths—about the
interactions between neurodivergence, criminal predilection, and
moral culpability.22
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/06/elizabeth-holmes-is-trying-to-start-a-newcompany [https://perma.cc/835E-RSNG]; PHILIP JENKINS, USING MURDER: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SERIAL HOMICIDE (1994). Similar modalities describing
urban or gang violence tend to instead invoke a racialized rhetoric of the godless brute.
See generally John Dilulio, The Coming of the Super-Predators, WASH. EXAMINER
(Nov. 27, 1995), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-comingof-the-super-predators [https://perma.cc/QD9V-MBDH].
14
See generally THE USUAL SUSPECTS (PolyGram Filmed Entm’t et al., 1995)
(homicidal and sexually-violent sociopath fools law enforcement by using Cerebral
Palsy as a literal disguise during an interrogation); PRIMAL FEAR (Rysher Entm’t
1996) (defendant in a murder trial fakes stutter and dissociative identity disorder to
invoke the insanity defense).
15
See generally Paul K. Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773
(1958); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985);
Marcelo Ferrante, Causation in Criminal Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 470
(2008).
16
See generally Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks, Law and the Social
Construction of Disability, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE 3
(Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 1999).
17
See generally Jean Stewart & Marta Russell, Disablement, Prison, and
Historical Segregation, 53 MONTHLY REV. 61 (2001); Liat Ben-Moshe, Disabling
Incarceration: Connecting Disability to Divergent Confinements in the USA, 39
CRITICAL SOCIO. 385, 386 (2011).
18
See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 721 (2014) (“The legal determination of
intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the
medical community’s diagnostic framework.”).
19
See M’naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (HL).
20
See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
21
See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582–83 (1975) (describing that
confinement to “protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts” falls
under state police power).
22
With regard to disability and moral volition, see, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (reasoning that mentally-retarded defendants “do not act with
the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct”); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (defining
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Law is a social institution that relies heavily on language to
develop idiosyncratic models and constructs of reality, defined by
consensus from within various legal communities about how a
“closed linguistic system should best reflect the outside world.”23
The title of this essay is attributable to Fiona Campbell’s
observation that disability fictions in law—in collusion with
biomedical discourses24—often construct difference in liminal
space where no literal referent exists, “deploy[ing] . . . a
‘compulsion towards terror’ . . . of ‘falling away’ and ‘crossing over’
into an uncertain void of dis-ease.”25
Building off this, my observation is that in criminal law and
policy, neurodivergent cognition does not seem to actually exist as
a concept except in contraposition to the idealized sovereign
subject of liberalism.26 Over centuries, and in conversation with
popular culture and public norms, law has constructed its own
amalgams of the “imbecilic” or “mad” criminal (who is not morally
accountable), as well as the compulsive predator or psychopath
(who largely is).27 Within these common, mostly unscientific, legal
frameworks, we must take note of how neurodivergence is
differentially asserted as both a causal mechanism of negation,28
mental illness to include abnormality that “substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls”).
23
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Model, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116
PENN. ST. L. REV. 987, 991 (2012); see also Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks:
Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 727, 727 (1989).
24
See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, Science and the Law: Uncomfortable Bedfellows, 38
SETON HALL L. REV. 1379, 1385–86 (2008); Brief for the American Psychiatric Ass’n,
American Psych. Ass’n, American Acad. of Psychiatry and L., et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 2, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135)
(noting that the APA has filed 175 amicus curiae briefs addressing “the effect of
mental illness and intellectual disability on criminal capacity.”).
25
Fiona AK Campbell, Inciting Legal Fictions: ‘Disability’s’ Date with Ontology
and the Ableist Body of the Law, 10 GRIFFITH L.R. 42, 44 (2001).
26
Conversion of a proposition from “all A is B” to “all not-B is not-A.”
27
For example, some states explicitly exclude personality disorders from the
insanity defense, including ones that undeniably fall within the definition of mental
illness under diagnostic frameworks. See OR. REV. STAT. § 161.295(2) (2018); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 29.8 (West 2013); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 659 (5th ed. 2013) (defining
“antisocial personality disorder” and linking it to “psychopathy”). For examples of
state civil confinement or treatment statutes that define mental abnormality through
a framework of compulsive predation, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 et seq. ( West
2015); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 9799.12 (2018); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03
(McKinney 2018).
28
Wherein disability causes a destruction of volition, rationality, moral reasoning
or understanding, choice, M’Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722 (requiring that, because of
mental disease or defect, defendant did not know that their conduct was wrong or the
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and of compulsion.29 For the sufficiently imbecilic or mad criminal,
all free agency is absent, and the disability tortures offender and
victim alike.30 For the psychopath, cognitive disability hijacks
volition by a rhetorically-eroticized compulsion.31 At best, the
former invokes a philosophically-controversial framework of
disability as negative causation,32 while the latter is perhaps even
more discursively damaging, attempting, perhaps paradoxically,
to personify inhuman acts of deviance as a form of disability.
Definitional shortcomings like these continue to exist in
American crime control, and disability-deviance narratives have

nature or quality of the act); Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1887)
(“[F]ree agency was at the time destroyed . . . [and] the alleged crime was so connected
with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and effect, as to have been the
product of it so[l]ely.”); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir.
1954) (emphasis added) (“[A]ccused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”); Insanity Defense Reform Act,
18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1984) (“[D]efendant, as a result of severe mental disease or defect,
was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.”).
29
Wherein disability causes a behavioral drive, stimulus, or constraint.
30
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *24-25, *395 (“[M]adness is its own
punishment.”); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1986) (applying the
same philosophy with regard to executing those with mental illness). The history here
is one of equivocating the moral status of those with cognitive disabilities to nonhuman life forms, within a framework of Cartesian dualism. See State v. Sikora, 210
A.2d 193 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1965) (“[C]riminal responsibility must be judged at the level
of the conscious.”); Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 695 (1724) (accused’s
responsibility depends on whether they were totally deprived of understanding and
memory such that they were “no more than an infant, than a brute or a wild beast”);
see also STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND
MORAL STATUS (2017).
31
And in doing so is almost phantasmic or Homerically godlike, acting upon a mostlyhelpless vessel but also imbuing it with something like “evil.” See J.C. Oleson, The Insanity
of Genius: Criminal Culpability and Right-Tail Psychometrics, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
587, 587 (2009) (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS: “As a brute has no vice or
virtue, so neither has a god.”). See Covey, supra note 11, at 1421 (“[S]imilar to the sex fiend
of the 1930s . . . [the predator] lacks sufficient volitional control . . . is sufficiently ‘mad’ for
purposes of initiating civil detention . . . [but] bears no direct correlation to legal insanity,
or even to clinically accepted definitions of mental illness.”). The psychotic compulsion is
broadly sadistic. PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 29 (1998); Shane Anthony, Is He a Sexual Predator,
Mentally Ill or Both?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 26, 2007, at 2; State v. Belcher, No.
CR94100508, 2019 WL 7630751, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2019) (“The sentencing
court . . . [referred] to the ‘super-predator’ theory that was advanced by Dr. John Dilulio of
Princeton University . . . [finding] that the petitioner had ‘no fears from your conduct of
the pains of imprisonment, nor do you suffer from the pangs of conscience.’ ”).
32
See, e.g., David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. PHIL. 556 (1973); Jonathan Schaffer,
Causes Need Not Be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative
Causation, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 197 (Christopher
Hitchcock ed., 2004).
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retained a stubborn appeal as a potential “root cause” of crime.33
Ultimately, I argue that cognitive disability—in its many forms—
and publicly-endangering criminal behavior are not defensiblyoverlapping conceptual domains to warrant their persistent
invocation in law or policy. Because of law’s broader influence
culturally, but also specifically in its nexus to public policy and
administration, and because of an ongoing history of criminalizing
disability, these definitional problems should not be overlooked.34
I. DEVIANCE AS PATHOLOGY
If crime exists, then what is its cause? One of the preeminent
historical functions of government has been the efficient
deterrence of criminal endangerment to the mainstream
populace.35 In furtherance of this end, Western criminology has
prioritized variants of “rational actor” theory, which posit,
generally, that crime is a personal choice based on individual
evaluations of its costs and benefits, meaning it is preventable
through adequate incentivization frameworks.36 Despite—or
maybe because of—the centrality of choice within these diverse
theories, experts and practitioners in law and criminology have
gone to pains to model cognitive traits that inhibit normative
“rationality.”37

33

See, e.g., James Q. Wilson, The Future of Blame, 46 NAT’L AFFS. 105, 113 (2010).
See RICHARD K. SHERWIN, WHEN LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE
BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 3–4 (2000).
35
See, e.g., Brandon C. Welsh & Rebecca D. Pfeffer, Reclaiming Crime Prevention
in an Age of Punishment: An American History, 15 PUNISHMENT & SOC. 534, 538–39
(2013).
36
See DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 9 (1964); JAMES Q. WILSON,
THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976);
Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A
Routine Activity Approach, 44 AM. SOC. REV. 588 (1979); DEREK B. CORNISH &
RONALD V. CLARKE, THE REASONING CRIMINAL: RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON
OFFENDING (1986). Also relevant here is the concept of “bounded or limited
rationality,” which focuses on the ways that individuals and groups simplify a decision
based on limited information or difficulty anticipating consequences of their actions.
Generally, there are two “sources” of bounded rationality: cognitive limitation and
extreme emotional arousal. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Emotional Arousal as a Source of
Bounded Rationality, 38 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 135, 139 (1998); see generally JON
ELSTER, RATIONAL CHOICE (1986).
37
See Covey, supra note 11, at 1375 (“Criminal madness . . . has posed a hard
problem for law, evidenced by the timeless controversy over the boundaries of criminal
responsibility, the basic meaning of the insanity defense, and the broader problem of
what to do with people whose mental, intellectual, or psychological attributes
diminish their ability to abide by the law.”).
34
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Culturally- and medically-formed notions of disability were
often inserted as a framework for understanding “irrational”
criminality.38 For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
a causal relationship between “feeblemindedness” and criminality
was seen as self-evident, both within law’s linguistic system39 and
in the biomedical and sociological sciences of criminology with
which it frequently commingled.40
Biological determinism
provided the theoretical foundation for this conventional view: The
expert and legal sentiment was that some individuals are simply
born to crime.41
This conventional view—when not explicitly eugenic—
manifested as a paternalistic rhetoric of “protectionism,”42 driven
by the notion that some individuals with aberrant cognitions
lacked free will43 to participate in the social contract and benefit
fully from its attendant liberties.44 We can see this in the dual
modern legacies of insanity and incompetence as a type of mercy
in adjudication and sentencing,45 as well as of prophylactic civil
hospitalization of the mentally ill.46 These policies and legal
frameworks were informed by the cutting-edge biomedical and
criminological sciences of the day, and often on the basis of causal
38

See PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION:
FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS 273 (1992).
39
See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 204 (1927) (“It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime . . . society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.”).
40
A framework known as “atavism” (reversion to the ancestral or bestial). See,
e.g., CESARE LOMBROSO, THE MAN OF GENIUS (1889); see generally HENRY H.
GODDARD, THE KALLIKAK FAMILY: A STUDY IN THE HEREDITY OF FEEBLEMINDEDNESS (1913); CHARLES BUCKMAN GORING, THE ENGLISH CONVICT: A
STATISTICAL STUDY (1913); EARNEST HOOTON, CRIME AND THE MAN (1939); William
P. DeStephens, Are Criminals Morons?, 38 J. SOC. PSYCH. 187 (1953).
41
See generally MARY GIBSON, BORN TO CRIME: CESARE LOMBROSO AND THE
ORIGINS OF BIOLOGICAL CRIMINOLOGY (2002).
42
See generally S.M. Rodriguez, Liat Ben-Moshe, & H. Rakes, Carceral
Protectionism and the Perpetually (In)Vulnerable, 20 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 537
(2020).
43
See Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1887).
44
Ingunn Moser, Against Normalisation: Subverting Norms of Ability and
Disability, 9 SCI. CULTURE 201, 207 (2000) (describing how people with disabilities
during the late-modern period were often “inserted into positions of problematic social
deviants that could and ought to be normali[z]ed”); see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT,
MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (1965).
45
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002).
46
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 418 (1979) (“The reasonable-doubt
standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the
uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet
and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment.”).
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stories that conflated social, cultural, and political alienation at
structural levels with biologically-predetermined deviance,
typically represented as “disability.”47
Practically speaking, this politics of vulnerability48 also
resulted in the large-scale, systematic “removal of marked
[disabled] bodies from public generative spaces.”49 Throughout
American history, removal on the basis of disability found
legitimacy in many forms and on all levels of law, policy, and
administration; in courts, in congress, and in federal, state, and
local governance. Municipal statutes—collectively referred to as
“Ugly Laws”—denied people with visible disabilities from public
areas.50
Civil
confinement
laws
allowed
involuntary
hospitalization for a wide range of disability conditions51 (later
updated to mostly encompass “endangering” psychiatric
conditions).52 Immigration restrictions projected inferior genetic
predisposition onto ethnic, racial, and cultural outsiders.53 During
the era of mass incarceration, the criminalization of vagrancy,
homelessness, and other nonviolent offenses contributed to the
“reinstitutionalization” of people with psychiatric disabilities in
47

See GIBSON, supra note 41, at 2.
See Sonja Feist-Price et al., Disability, Race and Ex-Offender Status: The TriVector Challenge to Employment, 45 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING 25, 27, 29 (2014).
49
Nirmala Erevelles, Crippin’ Jim Crow: Disability, Dis-Location, and the Schoolto-Prison Pipeline, in DISABILITY INCARCERATED: IMPRISONMENT AND DISABILITY IN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 81, 81 (Liat Ben-Moshe et al. eds., 2014). Public
policy during this period of American history often sought “to clarify and define who
deserved, and who was deservedly excluded from, citizenship” through legitimizing
narratives of the interplay between race, ethnicity, gender, and disability as genuine
biological difference. Douglas C. Baynton, Disability and the Justification of
Inequality in American History, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 17, 18 (Lennard
J. Davis ed., 5th ed. 2017).
50
See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 1612 (1881) (outlawing appearance in public
of those who are “diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed, so as to be an
unsightly or disgusting object”); cf. New Orleans, La., Ordinance 5046 (May, 1879)
(criminalizing “wandering abroad and endeavoring by the exposure of . . . deformities
to obtain or gather alms”); see generally SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS:
DISABILITY IN PUBLIC (2009).
51
See, e.g., Act of Sep. 14, 1965, 79 Stat. 685, 750–761 (hospitalization within the
District of Columbia for persons with mental illness) (codified as amended at D.C.
CODE §§ 21-501 to -591 (2021)); Kendra’s Law, Ch. 408, § 6, 1999 N.Y. Laws 1, 3
(McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (Consol. 2021))
(involuntary outpatient commitment prior to known dangerousness).
52
See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding
that involuntary commitment is only permissible where “there is an extreme
likelihood that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or
others”), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (finding district court’s injunctive orders not
specific enough to satisfy 65(d)); see also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 (2002).
53
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Pub.L. 47–126.
48
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carceral settings,54 with particularly damaging results for Black
Lawmaking and
and Brown people with disabilities.55
jurisprudence even legitimated the prior prevention of earthly
existence through prior regimes of forced sterilization,56 and civil
restitution for “wrongful birth” and “wrongful life.”57
II. DISABILITY, FREE WILL, AND THE (IR)RATIONAL ACTOR
Is disability a cause of criminogenic risk? Into present day, a
consensus seems to have emerged that atavism has fallen out of
favor in American crime control,58 but I think this impression is
overstated. Modern criminal justice policy in the West, and
particularly in the United States during the growth of the carceral
state during the 1970s, has been characterized as having an
“obsession with identifying, assessing and managing” risk factors
for crime commission and recidivism,59 again situating the nexus

54

See, e.g., Michael Rembis, The New Asylums: Madness and Mass Incarceration
in the Neoliberal Era, in DISABILITY INCARCERATED 139 (Liat Ben-Moshe et al. eds.,
2014).
55
See generally Erin J. McCauley, The Cumulative Probability of Arrest by Age 28
Years in the United States by Disability Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender, 107 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 1977 (2017).
56
See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.”); but see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 537, 542–44 (1942) (ruling that
state law permitting the compulsory sterilization of the “habitual criminal” violated
14th Amendment equal protection); see also id. at 545 (Stone, J., concurring) (“Science
has found and the law has recognized that there are certain types of mental deficiency
associated with delinquency which are inheritable. But the State does not contend . .
. either common knowledge or experience, or scientific investigation, has given
assurance that the criminal tendencies of any class of habitual offenders are
universally or even generally inheritable.”).
57
See Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab’ys, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480–81 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980) (a “wrongful life” case involving a severely disabled child’s legal guardian suing
a medical practitioner for damages related to their failure to prevent the child’s birth).
58
See generally R. Barri Flowers, Biological Perspectives on Delinquent Behavior,
in KIDS WHO COMMIT ADULT CRIMES: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY BY JUVENILE OFFENDERS
(R. Barri Flowers ed., 2002); RONALD L. AKERS & CHRISTINE S. SELLERS,
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES: INTRODUCTION, EVALUATION, APPLICATION 37–38
(2013).
59
John Muncie, The Globalization of Crime Control—the Case of Youth and
Juvenile Justice: Neo-Liberalism, Policy Convergence and International Conventions,
9 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 35, 38 (2005); see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan
Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its
Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (1992); David P. Farrington, Explaining and
Preventing Crime: The Globalization of Knowledge—The American Society of
Criminology 1999 Presidential Address, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2000); The History of Risk
Assessment, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/psrac/basics/
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where law and psychiatry meet as a locus of therapeutic
intervention.60 Concerningly, disability fictions, with roots in law,
are increasingly being operationalized within administrative
frameworks of crime prediction.61
A causal chain of neurodivergence-as-antecedent-to-crime
still pervades lawmaking, most notably in statutes that invoke
damaging stereotypes around the relationship between
intellectual and developmental disabilities and sexual predation,62
and the relationship between “mental illness” and gun violence.63
But in more banal and bureaucratic ways,64 local justice-system
practitioners—in prosecution, corrections, parole, and probation—
now frequently use a wide range of validated and unvalidated risk
assessment tools and checklists that ask them to predict future
likelihood of criminal offending based on factors related to
disability and psychosocial conditions.65 Judges and juries in
history-risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/QGE2-4SP7] (last visited Nov. 14, 2021);
John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCH. 489 (2015).
60
One development has been the growth in “mental health courts” around the
country, a form of diversion for individuals with mental health diagnoses, who are
dramatically over-represented in low-level arrest and incarceration, centered on
judicially-monitored assessment and community-based treatment. See, e.g., Nancy
Wolff et al., Mental Health Courts and Their Selection Processes: Modeling Variation
for Consistency, 35 L. HUM. BEHAV. 402 (2011); MICHAEL SHADER, OFF. OF JUV. JUST.
& DELINQ. PREVENTION, RISK FACTORS FOR DELINQUENCY: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2003)
FACTORS
FOR
DELINQUENCY],
[hereinafter
OJJDP
RISK
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/frd030127.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8JSL-NC8G]
(comparing actuarial risk assessment by criminal justice agencies to a doctor’s role in
identifying treatments for a heart attack).
61
This is perhaps unsurprising given the causal assumptions that have
undergirded the law’s interest in disability. However, serious crime is profoundly
difficult to predict. See generally BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION:
PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007). Assumptions
about the link between disability and deviance have increasingly been made
“actuarial.” Id. at 2.
62
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71A.12.200 (2006) (Community Protection
Program).
63
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (prohibiting sale of firearms to those who have
been “adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental
institution”); FLA. STAT. § 790.06(10)(h) (2021) (suspending or revoking a license to
carry a concealed firearm if the license holder is committed to a mental institution).
64
See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001) (broadly
describing penological shift from harsh deterrence to internal “management” of
surveilled groups).
65
See Matt Saleh & LaWanda Cook, Re-entry Services for Youth with Intellectual
and Developmental Disabilities: A Qualitative Cost-Benefit Analysis (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the use of both validated and unvalidated
psychometric actuarial assessments of juvenile “risk” by local criminal-legal system
practitioners); see also N.Y.S. DEP’T CORR. & CMTY SUPERVISION, Directive: COMPAS
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criminal trials and civil commitment proceedings—similarly find
themselves in regular dialogue with psychiatric experts about the
interplay between disability and criminogenic risk, both in terms
of mitigating factors and within a discourse of likelihood of future
harm.66
Even at the highest levels of crime-control policy and
administration, “cognitive and neurological deficits”, “low IQ,”
“learning disabilities,” “traumatic brain injury,” “medical-physical
problems,” and even “special education enrollment” are
presumptive indicators of criminogenic risk in individuals.67
Federally-funded research on predictive risk assessment,
developed for use in local criminal-legal settings, persistently aims
to understand criminal offending through hybrid latent constructs
related to mental health, learning disabilities, psychosocial
functioning,
antisocial
attitudes,
personality
disorder,
psychopathy, impulsivity, and other factors that either literally
are disability traits, or that overlap heavily with disability traits.68
ASSESSMENTS/CASE PLAN 1 (2019); see also State ex rel. D.D., 369 N.J. Super. 368,
372–73; 377–78 (2003) (describing local actuarial risk assessment and assessment of
risk factors related to personality functioning and substance abuse for youth with
learning disabilities and low-IQ whom the state was referring to adult adjudication);
In re Shelton, 53 Cal. App. 5th 650, 664–65 (2020) (discussing parole board’s
determination that an elderly plaintiff with Traumatic Brain Injury “continued to
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society,” based in part on disability
characteristics related to inability to take moral accountability for prior crimes).
66
See, e.g., Cruz v. Shinn, No. CV-13-00389, 2021 WL 1222168, at *16–17 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 31, 2021) (expert testimony discussing criminogenic risk resulting from
“hereditary predisposition to psychological disorder, personality pathology, and
alcohol and drug abuse and dependence, . . . neurodevelopmental issues including
probable fetal substance exposure, learning problems in school, chronic stress in
childhood, . . . head injuries,” and “[parental] psychological disorders,” and “teen onset
of psychological disorders”); In re Commitment of Ausbie, No. 14-18-00167-CV, 2021
WL 1972407, at *7–*9 (Tex. Ct. App. May 18, 2021) (expert testimony of appellant’s
dangerousness included “psychopathy checklist[s]” and findings of “schizoaffective
disorder,” “borderline intellectual functioning” affecting “ability to control . . . and
emotionally manage . . . behavior”); see also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d
444, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (prohibiting expert psychiatric testimony concerning
whether crime was the “product” of mental illness, because this is a legal
determination rather than a psychiatric one).
67
See, e.g., OFF. OF JUVENILE JUST. & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, RISK FACTORS FOR
DELINQUENCY, MODEL PROGRAMS GUIDE LITERATURE REVIEW 5 (2015) [hereinafter
OJJDP MODEL PROGRAMS GUIDE], https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/media
/document/risk_factors.pdf [https://perma.cc/2472-XTZT]; see also OJJDP RISK FACTORS
FOR DELINQUENCY, supra note 60, at 5 (listing “low IQ,” “medical, physical problems,” and
“hyperactivity” alongside “exposure to television violence”).
68
See, e.g., ROBERT D. HOGE ET AL., PREDICTION AND RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT,
STUDY GROUP ON THE TRANSITIONS BETWEEN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND ADULT
CRIME, GRANT REPORT TO THE U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 10–13 (2013),
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The result is a blended reliance on latent constructs, which
run the gamut from “rebelliousness” to “antisocial personality”
and “peer[s],”69 with formal psychiatric-diagnostic categories,
exemplifying implicitly causal theories of criminal disposition that
invoke decision making infirmities in the mind’s “central
command unit”70 as a type of regulation deficit or lack that must
be corrected through therapy.71 Much of the emphasis on the
relationship, or correlation, between disability and crime derives
from a parallel preoccupation in academic biological and
sociological criminology, which has become significantly
intertextual with courts through expert testimony and
policymakers through grant-funded research and demonstration.72
More modern criminological frameworks that marry rational
choice with “environmental,” biological, neurological, and genetic
determinants of criminal offending are gaining increased appeal,
resulting in modernity’s “soft,” biologically- and socially-based
form of determinism.73 In current frameworks, individualdisability traits are now situated within an invidious
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242934.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KN4-UX7G]
(describing efficacy of mental health, disruptive behavior and disorders, Attention DeficitHyperactivity Disorder, psychosis, and personality variables in risk assessment); Kris R.
Henning & Ryan M. Labrecque, Risk Assessment in Criminal Justice, Presentation at
the Justice Reinvestment Summit (Feb. 2017), in Criminology and Criminal Justice;
GINA VINCENT ET AL., OFF. JUVENILE JUST. & DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS, STUDYING
DRIVERS OF RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT IMPLEMENTATION IN
JUVENILE
JUSTICE,
JUVENILE
JUST.
BULLETIN
(Dec.
2018),
https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/library/publications/studying-drivers-risk-and-needsassessment-instrument-implementation-juvenile [https://perma.cc/4889-TZQW].
69
See OJJDP MODEL PROGRAMS GUIDE, supra note 67, at 4.
70
Ingunn Moser, Against Normalisation: Subverting Norms of Ability and
Disability, 9 SCI. CULTURE 201, 205 (2000).
71
See id. See generally Jean Marie McGloin et al., A Life-Course Analysis of the
Criminogenic Effects of Maternal Cigarette Smoking During Pregnancy: A Research
Note on the Mediating Impact of Neuropsychological Deficit, 43 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 412 (2006); see generally Pamela Lachman et al., Assessing Youth
Motivations for Joining a Peer Group as Risk Factors for Delinquent and Gang
Behavior, 11 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 212 (2013).
72
See, e.g., Frank Sirotich, Correlates of Crime and Violence Among Persons with
Mental Disorder: An Evidence-Based Review, 8 BRIEF TREATMENT & CRISIS
INTERVENTION 171, 176 (2008); see generally Matt DeLisi & Michael G. Vaughn,
Correlates of Crime, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY (Alex R. Piquero
ed., 2015); Michael T. Baglivio et al., Violent Juveniles’ Adverse Childhood
Experiences: Differentiating Victim Groups, 72 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 5–7 (2021); see also In
re Det. of Muns, No. 29920-1-III, 2013 WL 3148177 at *2, *5 (Wash. Ct. App., 3d Div.
June 18, 2013) (citing Robert J. McGrath, Joy A. Livingston, & Gail Falk, A Structured
Method of Assessing Dynamic Risk Factors Among Sexual Abusers with Intellectual
Disabilities, 112 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 221, 222 (2007)).
73
See MATZA, supra note 36; Flowers, supra note 58.
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“constellation” of community, family, and peer factors,74 assessed
“environmentally” to predict criminal functioning.75 Within this
new paradigm, developmental and psychosocial functioning have
been awkwardly merged with a racialized-class rhetoric of moral
and cultural poverty,76 exemplifying a familiar motif of ascribing
disability to groups who have been structurally oppressed and
disproportionately surveilled.77 Within rational actor frameworks
new-and-old, disability still serves a key discursive function: it
provides a source of individual-level “regulation deficits” thought
to inhibit free will, resulting in a criminal predilection, or risk, that
must be addressed through intervention—be it punitive or
therapeutic. As before, disability in crime-control policy is barely
more than a common foil for rationality.

74
See, e.g., Henrik Soderstrom et al., Adult Psychopathic Personality with
Childhood-Onset Hyperactivity and Conduct Disorder: A Central Problem
Constellation in Forensic Psychiatry, 121 PSYCH. RES. 271, 271 (2004).
75
See, e.g., Cohen & Felson , supra note 36, at 588–89. The most glaring problem
with these newer ecological models of crime is that their community-level variables
almost exclusively measure structural harm caused by de jure and de facto housing
segregation, employment and healthcare inequality intergenerational poverty, and
mass incarceration itself; all of which are associated with disability prevalence itself.
See, e.g., OJJDP MODEL PROGRAMS GUIDE, supra note 67, at 5–9 (describing
community-level risk factors such as living in a high-crime area, high-poverty
conditions, and justice-involved family or peers); but see generally Lisa Bowleg,
Reframing Mass Incarceration as a Social-Structural Driver of Health Inequality, 110
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S11 (2020); April D. Fernandes, How Far Up the River? Criminal
Justice Contact and Health Outcomes, 7 SOC. CURRENTS 29 (2019); Sebastian Daza et
al., The Consequences of Incarceration for Mortality in the United States, 57
DEMOGRAPHY 577 (2020); JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (2015).
Unfortunately, the criminal-legal system is one plausible antecedent (or “cause”) of
the structural inequalities that make up the community-level indicators of
criminogenic risk, which then get measured to predict involvement in the self-same
system, and round and round. In meaningful, causal, ways the system is potentially
measuring itself. See Seth J. Prins, Criminogenic or Criminalized? Testing an
Assumption for Expanding Criminogenic Risk Assessment, 43 L. & HUMAN BEHAV.
477, 489–90 (2019) (empirical findings that onset of exposure to the criminal-legal
system increases many of the indicators used to predict recidivism); see also Ulrike
Hahn, The Problem of Circularity in Evidence, Argument, and Explanation, 6
PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCH. SCI. 172, 180 (2011).
76
See generally George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The
Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1992, at 1-12; WILLIAM J.
BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY—AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR
AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS (1996); Interview by Randy Paige with Milton Friedman,
Sr. Research Fellow at Hoover Inst. (1991) (commenting on the “crack baby” epidemic).
77
See, e.g., Amanda L. Sullivan, Wading Through Quicksand: Making Sense of
Minority Disproportionality in Identification of Emotional Disturbance, 43 BEHAV.
DISORDERS 244, 245 (2017).
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CONCLUSION: THE PERSONIFICATION OF INHUMANITY
What’s wrong with people who commit crime? Medicalization
describes a “process by which nonmedical problems become
defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of
illnesses or disorders.”78 While some “correlates of crime” related
to personality traits like “self-control”79 and intellectual traits like
IQ80 have been empirically validated, theories of criminogenic risk
often extend nebulous casual stories about cognition and crime to
include developmental and intellectual disabilities; psychiatric
conditions like schizophrenia and chronic depression; and
psychosocial factors like trauma, neglect, antisocial peers, and
substance abuse, where the actual relationship to crime is far from
clear.81 Even the interpretation of disability within the criminallegal system has been shown to be highly contingent on factors
related to the unique intersectionality of the individual being
arrested, adjudicated, convicted, sentenced, and so on.82
This partly stems from what I think are faulty logical
processes that don’t quite know if they’re inductive or deductive.83
If people who commit crime usually have lower-IQs, then people
with intellectual and/or developmental disabilities must also have
a higher propensity for crime. If people with lower self-control
commit more crime, then people with disabilities that affect selfcontrol must also have higher propensity for crime. But criminallegal system practitioners are usually working their way back
from a crime, searching for a reason. The reality is that most of
these theories about personality and intelligence are not validated
for populations of people with disabilities, most clearly evidenced
by the fact that the observed differences in IQ between offenders

78
Peter Conrad, Medicalization and Social Control, 18 ANN. REV. SOC. 209, 209
(1992).
79
See, e.g., Alexander T. Vazsony et al., It’s Time: A Meta-Analysis on the SelfControl-Deviance Link, 48 J. CRIM. JUST. 48, 48–49 (2017).
80
Travis Hirschi & Michael J. Hindelang, Intelligence and Delinquency: A
Revisionist Review, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 571, 581 (1977) (finding that offenders have an
average IQ score of about 92, or 8 points below the population average of 100).
81
See, e.g., Jacqueline Pei et al., Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder and the
Criminal Justice System: A Research Summary, 2 J. MENTAL HEALTH & CLIN. PSY.
48, 50–51 (2018) (warning against inappropriately associating fetal alcohol spectrum
disorder, a developmental disability, with criminal behavior, instead of prioritizing
structural determinants related to poverty, unstable housing and unemployment,
racism, lack of access to services).
82
See, e.g., McCauley, supra note 55.
83
See generally ELLIOTT SOBER, CORE QUESTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY: A TEXT WITH
READINGS (6th ed. 2013).
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and nonoffenders in the literature does not actually fall within,
and is typically higher than, the common meaning of “intellectual
disability.”84
In essence, disability becomes a heuristic for expeditiously
describing some of the known behavioral and cognitive aspects of
criminal acting, but it does not follow that disability interjects as
a cause in criminal offending. Empirically speaking, then, any a
priori assumption—whether implicit85 or explicit86—that disability
causes criminal offending likely commits the post hoc ergo propter
hoc fallacy.87
Another major problem is that crime data is notoriously
difficult to interpret, in part because measurement limitations
often result in statistics that capture who was caught committing
crime, rather than a true, unbiased measure of criminal
offending.88 In short, what we more likely know, empirically
speaking, is that people with certain cognitive disabilities are
overrepresented in arrest and incarceration; we don’t know that
they are disproportionately represented in the actual commission
of crime compared to those without cognitive disabilities.89 Acts of
extreme violence, statistically speaking, are rare and difficult-topredict events, but they also take up a disproportionate share of
the public attention, fear, and imagination about crime.90 Even
the broader category of “violent crime” only makes up a small
84

See, e.g., Anthony Holland, Criminal Behaviour and Developmental Disability:
An Epidemiological Perspective, in OFFENDERS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
23 (William Lindsay et al. eds., 2004).
85
See, e.g., C. S. Allely et al., Violence is Rare in Autism: When it Does Occur, is it
Sometimes Extreme? 151 J. PSYCH. 49, 49–51 (2017) (small sample, post hoc coding of
mass shooters for “potential [autism] features”).
86
See, e.g., W. Huw Williams et al., Traumatic Brain Injury: A Potential Cause of
Violent Crime?, 5 LANCET PSYCH. 836 (2018).
87
Since event Y followed event X, event Y must have been caused by event X.
88
See generally Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil
Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 15 (2019).
89
See, e.g., Anna Scheyett et al., Are We There Yet? Screening Processes for
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities in Jail Settings, 47 INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 13 (2009); Jennifer Bronson et al., Disabilities Among
Prison and Jail Inmates, 2011-12, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (2015); Aleksis P. Kincaid &
Amanda L. Sullivan, Double Jeopardy? Disproportionality in First Juvenile Court
Involvement by Disability Status, 85 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 453 (2019); Connie L.
Kvarfordt et al., Youth with Learning Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System: A
Training Needs Assessment of Detention and Court Services Personnel, 34 CHILD &
YOUTH CARE F. 27 (2005).
90
See, e.g., Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the
Insanity Defense, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 68–69 (1994).
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amount of arrests each year—less than 5%91—and the vast
majority of violent crime is not committed by people with cognitive
disabilities—who only make up about 5% of the U.S. population.92
In short, when we emphasize the role of cognitive disability in
dangerous crime, we are talking about a sliver of a sliver of the
actual threat that exists in our society. Our conceptions of “risk”
are entirely out of proportion.93
Deficit modeling of criminal behavior is self-legitimizing. The
term “disability” “names thousands of human conditions and
varieties of impairment, from the slight to the severe…[i]t is a
category whose constituency is contingency itself.”94 While the
criminal-legal system has been slow to adopt non-medical models
of disability, other areas of American public policy95 now view
disability within a “social model” that reframes disability’s
causation account, defining disability “as disadvantage caused by
the confluence of (1) personal impairment and (2) a social setting
comprising architecture, economics, politics, culture, social norms,
aesthetic values, and assumptions about ability.”96 Somewhere in
that list lie the stories that law tells. The overarching legal fictions
of cognitive disability, in my reading, do not satisfy basic tests for
logical inclusion in crime-control policy frameworks, and should
not be continued.

91

See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2019 (2020), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crime-in-theu.s.-2019/topic-pages/persons-arrested.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL4W-BSTP].
92
WILLIAM ERICKSON ET AL., 2018 DISABILITY STATUS REPORT UNITED STATES 5, 10
(2018), https://www.disabilitystatistics.org/StatusReports/2018-PDF/2018-StatusReport
_US.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUF6-TD4H]; see also DEANGELIS, supra note 4, at 21.
93
See DEANGELIS, supra note 4, at 21.
94
SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY (1998).
95
See generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat.
3553 (2008).
96
Adam M. Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1251, 1257 (2007). See also MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 22 (1990).

